Classical Theism

Well for the proponents, maybe really read Rosenberg. I really have to examine how much a naturalist is forced to follow him, because if he argues persuasively, then Iīd claim it is the best reductio ad absurdum against naturalism (Michael Reas "World without Design" is also pretty good). Another proponent would perhaps be Thomas Metzinger.
Iīm currently reading some Stephen Mumford, not really naturalist, but atheist enough (lol).

Arguing FOR naturalism convincingly is really hard, critiquing theistic arguments seems way easier. Best example of that was Mackies endorsement of Dawkins "The Selfish Gene". The debate between J.L. Mackie vs Mary Midgley on that topic is really worth to read.

CLT,

MM (are you John West?) has given you a link which describes the probably biggest problem of DS, since it includes Divine free will and the knowledge of contingencies into this one objection. Unlike Vallicella, I have problems to just go the mysterian route (I assume that if you had somewhat confirmatory mystical experiences, then you are way more likely to accept it), but I also agree with Pruss that we wonīt solve the problem unless we will be able to witness the divine essence. Perhaps this two papers will be of interest:

Timothy OīConnor- Simplicity&Creation (https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1762&context=faithandphilosophy)
Alexander Pruss- On Two Problems of Divine Simplicity (https://drive.google.com/file/d/1q5JyWcfSM0txLWuRbLzG2aqN_qy5comm/view?usp=sharing)

Generally, since what God knows is identical to what God wills, Iīd ask if an externalist epistemology of belief would solve both problems at once, since it preserves contingency without accidents without requiring a model of divine free will (quite frankly, we donīt even have a coherent concept of Libertarian Free Will in us, although we experience it constantly, so humility is warranted).

I donīt claim that the problems are solved or even that they can be solved, but I claim that this objection is not a dead end for the defender and that there are ways to proceed to show that the contradictions are only apparent.

I donīt take life itself to be necessary, but as an example of something God might be impressed with, so that he creates. I donīt think that it entails that life must have arisen on earth, much less that the individual animals (like us two) must have been there, though Iīm very much convinced, that one could argue, that if God created a world, then life anywhere at some point must have arisen.
An alternative could be to say that God wills freedom for his creation or rather "creativity" (though it is hard to see what that could be without conscious agents).My idea was that God creates without determining, but that he knows through his act of creating since every moment in within him. I know that it doesnīt solve the problem as to how God knows a contingent fact without changing, but if successfull, it avoids modal collapse.

This Iīm not sure about, certainly the guys from The SMithy would qualm with your formulation, however like I said Iīm still a beginner at Scotus, so I donīt go any further. If a problem with the thomistic DS is perceived however, I still believe that a weaker DS is the key and that the supposed composition would be only appearing if the thomistic metaphysics were presupposed. But I also donīt think that there is the problem of necessity if God as unchanging being canīt change his mind. I canīt give an exhaustive account here though.

I suppose I'm a bit late but I've been reading Feser's Scholastic Metaphysics.

I am listening to it.  I have the book at home, but I downloaded the audio version Machinephilosophy has recorded, to have somethiong to listen to when Iīm driving. I still stuck at Vallicellaīs book, not only is it the hardest work I have ever been working through, but it deserves the such a detailed treatment, especially if one wants to really understand what the modern discourse on existence is lacking.

Nevertheless, I was more concerned about the semantic issue at stake, rather than the veracity of the CP. Basically, I was questioning whether the sustaining of a thing in existence can really be phrased in terms of the act/potency distinction. I think the conclusion I've come to is yes, but not in a strict sense, like temporal change. A thing remains X because the potential for X to be actual is kept actual by Y. I'm not super satisfied with this position, though.

If that is the basic concern, then I think that RomanJoe has said enough. There is nothing obviously false with explaining existence in terms of act and potency. Iīd go so far as to say that combined with an Aristotelian philosophy of nature, this is the best game in town, since it keeps the beginning of life, as well as the death intelligible.
However, of course, everything depends on the definition of existence applied here, if you assume a Fregean notion like Kenny did when reviewing Aquinas, then of course this doesnīt make a lick of sense.
Like I said, Iīm not yet well versed enough to give a deeper explanation, but I want to return to the concerns I raised above and your describtion of Oppys position.

Oppy would say, Dominik, that the existence of the cat would continue to exist insofar as nothing impedes on its existence.

This is either question-begging or avoiding the issue altogether, pick one. If itīs the former then Oppy already assumes an account of existence, which is however exactly what is the issue here.

To give a simpler example, the chair will remain in X location until some other object acts upon the chair, changing its location from X to Y (I think the analogy works because Oppy doesn't make distinctions between essential and accidental properties, but he couldn't because he is a nominalist).

Letīs stay with the cat, just because it is easier to illustrate the problems I suspect with Oppys position. I assume that Oppy uses the deflationary Fregean notion, since in the discussion with Feser I can recall him working on different existing simples with different charges. In the A-T framework this would make those supposed simples composites, but when "existing" here merely states that the "concept of simple X is instantiated", the problem could be avoided. (Do nominalists have the resource to apply concepts? They sound awfully close to universals when formulated that way). But I think this makes the existence of said simples unintelligible, which becomes even more apparent when we climb the ladder of being to higher levels to living matter and individuals.
I think that this proposition runs exactly into the problem I raised in the last post, that the existence of the cat becomes entirely reducible to the spatial existence of the matter. Because what does it even mean for the cat to exist until something impedes on said existence? What is the existence here supposed to be? Though Oppy may be a materialist, the way I see it it is a reductio ad absurdum. In a nominalist framework the problem only becomes even more obvious.

Lets say a glass is holding water. Oppy would say that the water will remain in the glass until something acts upon on it which would impede on the waters being in the glass. Well what if the glass broke? The water would change locations obviously, and Oppy would be happy with this, but it seems very suspicious to me that the water didn't move until the glass was no longer able to hold it. Simply put, it sounds very suspiciously like the AT CP.

I think I understand your point, though it isnīt so apparent to me when we are only talking about water or chairs. Hence my constant illustrations with the cat. Maybe you can be a bit more clear in your last paragraph here.

Sorry for the rambling, it reads strange when I read it over again, but Iīm struggling a bit with the language barrier.

Though I think this interpretation of the natural law is that way due to man being made in Gods image. Since that prevents any exclusions from the strict prohibition of abortion, it only follows that a similarily high view of life is applied when dealing with suicidal people. This is not so problematic when the person is able to do it himself, after all no human being will or can judge you afterward, and if youīre not religious, you also donīt fear judgment from God. The question becomes way more complicated if you need assistance. And here the Church condemnation is consistent with the position on the beginning of life.

The way I read Brian, the Stoics donīt have the resource on their own to forbid abortion based on their philosophy, since based on solely that reasonably the question could be asked if an abortion due to disease or genetic disorders wouldnīt be the more mercyful action. Iīm not open to that discussion, period.

"His objection, at its heart, was that once a thing already actually is, no longer needs a mover because it just is already actual."

Iīm still tentative to make any statement when it comes to my convictions on the nature of existence. However such objections canīt be right, since the consequences are untenable. Letīs take a cat as an example.
The cat already exists, so according to Oppy it wouldnīt need a mover anymore. This leaves us with:

1. The cat will live forever.
2. Vitalism as an efficient cause, therefor the cat will die once the life-substance is used up.
3. The death of the cat is unintelligible.
4. The death of the cat is entirely reducible to the relocation of matter, thus commiting us to a strict mechanistic materialism.

Did I forget an option? Anyway, the way I see it, none of those can be correct.

On Aristotelianism however, the death of the cat becomes intelligible, without committing ourselves to mechanistic philosophy or life-substances as efficient causes. If the cat is alive, the material fills out the form of the cat. Once the material canīt do that anymore, e.g. once the material within the DNA-strings donīt hold together anymore, the form of the cat isnīt filled out and it vanishes; the cat dies.
So the way I see it, the claim that existence is not a potential actualized at every moment but something inherent in existing objects, commits one to unacceptable consequences.

Thoughts?