Classical Theism

That matter itself is contingent is pretty much a given, absurdities lurk when denied.

My question is though if the atheist can avoid Spinozism through claiming that fundamental matter has necessarily indetermined causes? In other words would indeterminancy provide contingency?

And more importantly, and this is the objection I would give, could we even expect indeterminate causes? It seems like if we asserted the necessity of the matter and its properties, positing indeterminancy would come close to a contradiction.

There are multiple problems with a material necessary foundation; one of which is necessitarianism (why should this particular arbitrary universe have to exist?). An indeterministic material cause would avoid this problem, sure. But there are other problems with a material necessary cause. And this position in itself is a cost, as it significantly raises complexity (and a truly random, indeterministic impersonal first cause seems very strange), if it's even possible (non-free indeterministic action is controversial, especially a global action which could create universes)