CLT,
your argument assumes that creation has to have happened, the big bang is in every possible world. Letīs drop for this argument the idea of counterfactuals in God, since that is concerned with contingent knowledge in God.
Here is an argument against the idea of creation following from God necessarily, which User Brandon has posted in the thread on Aquinas and the Necessity of Creation:
I'm guessing, though, that your implicit argument is something like
(1) 'God exists' is necessary
(2) In God, existence and will are identical.
(3) Therefore 'God wills' is necessary (from (1) and (2))
(4) Therefore 'God wills X' is necessary for any X you might choose. (from (2))
Which, if so, fails regardless of the account of identity; 'God wills' and 'God wills X' are not generally intersubstitutable descriptions -- the former is a description of God, and the latter is a description of God and X. From 'It is necessary that God wills' to 'It is necessary that God wills such-and-such' is an equivocation; intransitive and transitive 'wills' are not synonymous. To get from (3) to (4) you would have to assume that if it is necessary that God wills, what God wills is necessarily willed by Him. But this is the very point in dispute.
A similar point has been made by Tomaszewski on the idea of creation following necessarily, because God is identical to his will and he exists necessarily. īThe following argument is of the same structure, but shows the invalidity of said argument and why the modal collapse objection fails:
1) Necessarily, 8 > 7.
2) The # of planets in our solar system is 8.
3) Necessarily, the # of planets in our solar system is greater than 7.
So I donīt claim that we can understand how God could create freely, heck we donīt even really have an idea how it is that WE are free. But the argument leads to absurdities and hence we should accept that it is false. I also understand the idea of God creating nothing at all only insofar as there is not potential in God that creation fulfills.