Classical Theism

But if God had decided from all eternity that there was another world, that wouldn't involve any changing of his mind contrary to what you said: it would be altogether another situation.

Ofc, I'm not gonna pretend that this solve entirely the problem: for it seems to imply there's still some contingency in the will of God, which is, given divine simplicity, God Himself. This paper from Alexander Pruss would be on point: http://alexanderpruss.com/papers/On3ProblemsOfDivineSimplicity.html

I think what could help is a softer version of divine simplicity. I am certain that DS is true, but the question is, how strong need it be? If I remember correctly Vallicella has also toyed with the idea of attributing accidental mental states to God.

I think the issue I'm trying to get at is more of a timelessness problem. Although divine simplicity brings about its own set of problems with respect to things like mental states, it seems to me to be the case the issue wouldstill be present with a being which was composite as well.

I think any weaker version of DS is going to involve the affirmation of real composition of essense/existence in God, and to me, this is undesirable.

I don't see how a formal distinction could really avoid bringing in composition while remaining coherent. The idea of formal distinctions, as I understand them seems to be contradictory. How could the attributes of God be univocal and at the same time not distinct from one another; that omnipotence and timelessness are different but actually the same? I think if pressed, the scotist would devolve into affirming a conceptual distinction.

Although, from what I understand, something is simple iff it is not seperable (to Scotus). Scotus would be correct according to this definition of simplicty but would fail, atleast on a thomistic analysis, to be the most ontologically absolute thing. To Thomas (and to me), Scotus' "formal distinction" is really just a real distinction under a different light.